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PREFACE 
It has been said "All the books ever written concern knowledge that 
we have. These would make but a small part of the true library of total 
knowledge. The books yet to be written cover an infinite amount of 
knowledge. " 
It is my belief that the present knowledge of safety is very small 
compared to the amount yet to be uncovered. This dissertation attempts 
to uncover a bit more of that hidden knowledge. By pushing the horizons 
of knowledge in industrial safety, I feel that all areas of safety -- in 
the home, on the road, at play -- will be served. 
The members of the committee for my work are acknowledged wi.th 
sincere thanks: Dr. Earl J. Ferguson, who gave detailed direction, en-
couragement, and aid whenever needed; Doctors James E. Shamblin and 
Paul E. Torgersen, who provided the necessary critique of certain areas 
to help improve the study; Dr. Rudolph W. Trenton, who gave constant en-
couragement and a pragmatic view, and Dr. Luther G. Tweeten, who gave his 
interest and encouragement at all times. 
For her continuing assistance breaking me in to the Staff and typing 
this work, my deep thanks go to Miss Velda Davis. 
Finally I must recognize: my father, now deceased, for his ever-
present and cherished influence; my mother, whose continual encouragement 
has ever been an aid over obstacles; and my wife, Jeanette, whose will-
igness to sacrifice her time, effort, and our financial well-being was 
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and will continue to be inspirational. This dissertation is respectfully 
dedicated to all these people who have had such an accumulating influence 
on this work. 
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Safe practices in all areas of daily living have received an in-
creasing amount of publicity since the middle-1940's (1, p. 2). Complex 
appliances and equipment using power sources, which are potentially 
lethal, become necessities both at home and on the job. Because a man's 
livelihood depnds on his earning capacity, and thereby his health, 
safety on the job becomes of vital concern to the individual personally 
and collectively as a member of the group. Because people from all walks 
of life become closely associated in an industry, their interrelation-
ships can affect a large population. Industrial safety is in one sense a 
cornerstone to a man's livelihood and safe behavior an important part of 
the individual's relationship to others. This study encompasses these 
worker interrelationships as manifested in the occurrence of safety haz~ 
ards on the job. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to establish a research procedure 
whereby industrial safety hazards may be analyzed and their significance 
applied on the basis of photographic studies. The research is fundamen-
tally experimental as there are no statistical data concerning safety 
hazard frequency in industry except in the most general terms (21, 
pp. 21-30). Traditional research in the' field of industrial safety has 
1 
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been devoted to accidents with injury and has concentrated on analysis of 
historical data. An apparent necessity is the development of research 
procedures to determine safety hazards prior to accident occurrence and, 
thereby, concentrate on the elimination of danger to the human beings in-
volved. The elimination of danger is a positive approach to accident 
prevention. The problem was presented to the author during a research 
for thesis subject material by the staff of the School of Industrial 
Engineering and Management at Oklahoma State University in the Spring of 
Safety is an intangible but, if practiced diligently, can result in 
substantial cost savings in the areas of maintenance, absenteeism, in-
surability, lost production, and production unit cost (2, p. 110). These 
factors, plus other considerations, will show cost reductions when 
equated with improved safety records. In addition, there are intangible 
areas such as better personnel morale, higher personal efficiency, and re-
duced supervisory time -- savings which are immeasurable in terms of 
actual dollar figures (12, p. ,·:)). 
The approach to improving a safety record must be on an organized 
basis as must any program for cost reduction within industrial organiza-
tions. The goal of any safety program must have at its nucleus the 
welfare of the human beings involved in the day-to-day operations; and a 
safety analysis, therefore, must center upon human acts or their results. 
Safety in the broad sense of the term is wholeness of life; 
in the narrow sense, wholeness of physical life, implying the 
avoidance of accidents •••• the knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes that make for safety. Accidents do not just 
happen. They are caused (3, p. 112). 
Much of the research on safety has concentrated on the repetitive 
work cycle where, the National Safety Council (4, p. 128) states, "Habits 
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and carJ,essness causing unsafe acts are the major causes of accidents.I' 
In this study, the research has concentrated on the non-repetitive work 
cycle in an attempt to uncover areas of potential safety hazards not im-
mediately apparent in a static evaluation or in an analysis of historical 
accident data. 
Most present day accident analyses depend on historical reports to 
highlight the hazardous situation (5, p. 113). The individual accident 
is simulated, reenacted, and disassembled into the component elements so 
that an analysis can state why the accident occurred. This is an after-
the-fact study and is not a positive means to prevent accidents or high-
light hazards of a similar nature unless the same general environment is 
present each time. An accident does not occur each time a hazard occurs. 
However, the number of situations where accident potential is present 
must, logically, be some multiple of the accident figure. 
The study attempts to document, by means of a film record, the poten-
tial accidents.that occur in common materials handling situations and 
relate them to the over-all safety program"as envisaged by the personnel 
responsible for safety. 
Specific Objectives 
The specific objectives of this study are as follows: 
l. To demonstrate the usefulness of the memo-activity camera 
as an industrial safety tool to be used in implementing 
and evaluating safety programs. 
2. To establish a procedure in categorizing unsafe acts. 
3. To calculate the frequency of unsafe acts in an area in a 
particular time period. 
4. To delineate actions which will reduce accident frequency 
and/or severity. 
Scope 
The data were gathered in three industrial locations in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma: the Federal Aeronautics Agency, Aeronautical Center, 
Storage Management; the Tinker Air Force Base Engine Maintenance Branch; 
and the Western Electric Company, Inc., Oklahoma City Works, These three 
work areas were selected on the basis of their alleged 1heavy 0 use of 
fork lift truck equipment and the similarity in use of the equipment at 
the three areas in transporting materiel to the using agency within the 
confines of a covered area. Data are not available as to how frequent 
the fork lift vehicles are involved in accidents. Records of the re-
quired detail are not kept by industry; however~ the accident frequency 
over-all is high enough (see Table IX) to warrant study. 
The study encompasses the evaluation of a means of research on 
safety hazards using camera equipment in time lapse photography. The 
areas of intere,st covered are: camera mounting to vehicular equipment~ 
data gathering, film analysi9 and evaluation, and a critique as to the 
use of the research procedure in safety analysis for industrial applica-
tion. The limitations to the study are based on the inherent limitations 
of the tools and equipment u.sed plus the lack of concrete starting points 
in the areas of safety due to the nebulousness of the subject matter. 
Safety as a subject for finite study has not been explored industrially 
with the quantitative analytical approach as used in the tangible profit-
making areas; thus 9 supporting and background data are difficult to 
obtain and place in a workable format (6~ p. 2). 
Methodology 
This study begins wj_th a survey of the evolution of safety in 
industry and the attempts to reduce accidents. Then by means of an em-
pirical experiment, a research method is proposed to focus attention on 
safety hazards and, thereby, to aid in preventing accidents. 
Procedure 
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A camera (see Chapter III) was mounted on fork lift trucks used in 
non-repetitive work cycles. The trucks then proceeded on normal duties 
throughout the work day. The camera operated in two ways; i.e., continu-
ously and in random hourly increments over two separate time periods. 
Film was exposed on a time lapse basis of one frame every twelve seconds. 
In addition, the camera was mounted stationary over a high density traf-
fic aisle and film was exposed at a slightly faster rate. This was done 
to evaluate potential accident frequency along aisles wj_th high density 
pedestrian and vehicular t~affic at one location. This then allows an 
evaluation from two aspects -- the potential accident situations encoun-
tered by a moving vehicle and the same type situations encountered at a 
single location. 
The writing approach begins wj_th a survey of safety in industry and 
the background that led to the present-day attitudes. The costs associ-
ated wj_th safety, or the lack of it, and the benefits to be derived from 
good safety are considered. The study continues with a detailed relating 
of the experiment and the data collection on film. The films are dis-
cussed and analyzed by means of statistical techniques. A qualitative 
discussion is presented based on the frequency of pedestrian or vehicular 
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hazard occurrence and how this knowledge can lead to more effective 
safety programs. Finally, the usefulness of the research is discussed 
in relation to present-day industrial needs. On the basis of the lack of 
literature and/or research on safety in the particular area, this study 
is independent (2, p. 112). 
This first chapter covers the general plan of writing the thesis: 
the purpose of the writing, the specific objectives, the scope of the 
paper, the methods used in gathering data and approach to the writing , 
and the significance of the study. 
The second chapter contains background and supporting information on 
safety and a discussion of the need for greater safety hazard awareness 
in industry. 
The third chapter describes in detail the equipment used during the 
experiment. 
The fourth chapter details the quantitative analysis , the concept of 
a control chart, and the means of categorizing and quantifying the hazards 
photographed. 
The fifth chapter discusses the application of t he results quant i-
fied in chapter four. 
The final chapter gives the summary , conclusions, and the suggested 
areas for further study. 
Sources 
A literature researchof the field of safety was made and correspond-
ence with the leading companies in the field was initiated to gather dat a 
on the particular area of research and to determine what had already been 
done or what background was available. The returns from the correspondence 
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with Mine Safety Appliance Company, Hyster Corporation, and the Maynard 
Research Council, Inc., indicated that the research in this area was nil. 
Information was obtained from periodicals on safety, a survey of the 
available texts covering the ·subject, the U.S. Government periodicals 
concerning accidents, several industrial and government employees inter-
viewed, and the actual research by the author. The Bibliography lists 
the available literature used and, as can be noted, the literature is 
lacking. Much data exists on accident frequencies and the associated 
costs, but there is effectively no reference to the hazard -- its fre-
quency or an analysis of it. 
Safety is a popular subject, but the particular means of analysis 
used by the author seems not to have been used elsewhere(?, p. 20). 
Time lapse photography has not been fully exploited by industry although 
it is often used for 'effect' photography. There are few indications 
that this technique has been used in the field of Safety Engineering. 
Isolated incidents of experimentation in public transportation using time 
lapse photography are inconclusive. 
Definition of Terms 
_There are various terms used by the author throughout this study 
which require standardizing and clarification for the reader. lhe fol-
lowing are definitions of the terms used: 
Safety - The condition of be~ng secure -from undergoi:ng or. 
causing loss or injtµ-y. 
Accident ... Any unplanned, unexpected occurrence that inter-
feres with or interrupts the orderly progress of 
events. In industry, the word 'events' becomes 
'work'. An accident may involve men, materials, 
machinery and tools, equipment, and time or any 
combination of these elements. 
Incident - A subordinate category of 'Accident' where no 
injury or substantial monetary loss is involved. 
Fork Lift - A truck chassis carrying a channel mast on which 
or 
Fork Truck is mounted an adjustable cantilevered fork which 
can be hydraulically or mechanically actuated in 
the lifting of materiel. It is designed to lift, 
support, and carry loads of materiel. 
Hazard - A situation encompassing a direct source of im-
ment danger if personnel or equipment do not 
alter their apparent actions. The situation may 
have accident or incident potential, the cause 
for which can be traced to the actions of one or 
more human beings. These actions may be inten-
tional or unintentional, the commission or 
omission of an act. 






between film frames such that when projected a 
slow motion appears rapidly speeded up. 
Significance of the Study 
Mr. H. M. Somers (4, p. 5) stated in 1954 in his book, Workmen 9 s 
Compensation: 
8 
••• in the course of an average workday (in the period 
1942 through 1952) • • • sixty-two workers will have 
been killed, 350 will have suffered some permanent im-
pairment, and 7600 will have suffered injuries which will 
keep them from work on an average of eighteen work days. 
In other words, one American worker is killed or maimed 
every three minutes and another is injured every eleven 
seconds. 
Based on the Bureau of Labor publication, Monthly Labor Review, in the 
9 
years 1962, 1963, and 1964, the statistics quoted above are reduced by a 
mere two to three per cent (8). The potential reduction in human suffer-
ing by increased emphasis on safe conduct appears obvious. This poten-
tial, plus the associated costs of accidents in all areas, monetary and 
humanitarian, certainly justify research in the area of safety and the 
means to promote and evaluate the efforts expended. 
The repetitive work cycle has received a great deal of attention 
from the people responsible for safety, chiefly due to the number of 
accidents in repetitive work and the feasibility in pinpointing responsi-
bility for the accidents. In non-repetitive work cycles, however, the 
variety of safety hazards is much wider in scope and involves many more 
people. The normal means of safety analysis in non-repetitive work 
cycles is based on a subjective analysis of past accidents and, thereby, 
the establishment of procedures to prevent similar type accidents in the 
future. 
No one, however, can mentally forsee all the potential accidents and 
the safety hazards that are encountered in daily operations. The use of 
time lapse moving pictures taken from an operational vehicle is a means 
to analyzing the hazards encountered. There is still an element of sub-
jectivity in the analysis, but there is photographic evidence to justify 
an interpretation. These films are direct, reusable evidence of safety 
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hazards occurring locally and can be used by management to establish the 
areas or personnel which are most susceptible to hazardous conditions. 
The establishment of this susceptibility will then give positive guidance 
for the emphasis of safety programs and give specific purpose to the 
efforts of personnel responsible for safety. This provides safety per-
sonnel areas of positive action; whereas, in the past, they normally 
v 
awaited the accident and then acted to prevent the same type of accident 
recurring. 
There may be a relationship between safety hazard frequency and 
accident frequency as alluded to by Heinrich in his theories on the sub-
ject concerning one man (9, p. 26); however, this relationship has not 
been established a.rid any conclusions are not possible by means of this 
study. The relationship possibilities are discussed in Chapter IV. 
.. ,~·eHAP'~-n----
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Industrial safety is a nebulous thing in its history. It is vitally 
concerned with people and the vagaries of the human being in the indus-
trial world; yet its evolution has been eclipsed until recent years by 
the demands of production improvementso The procedures and conclusions 
in the field of safety, as presently applied, are based on the evolved 
practices of industry and have little basis in rational continuous 
thought. 
When the Industrial Revolution took place before the turn of the 
Century, habits of the individual and the group in the area of safe prac-
1 
tic es were difficult to inculcate with the necessary now equipment~ ('1.&,"·· 
P:tt1?.J..~!.c consciousness of the need for accident contra~ W~j;;L-.fi,!"st' 
awaken:e~by the terrible working conditions P.rev:ai-li"ng in the 
industria~~rs of Europe. • ••. " ilh-e"·"revol utionary changes 
in • • • manufacturfri"g'·pr.o~~sjS,e'S' ~ ~·: brought men and women flock-
ing from the far_in§._.t0··tlie" ci ti~s. • o.. Many who had formerly 
plied the_;;r;:.A-rades and skills in'· tp.eir homes or in small shops 
now ... .wer1fed in factories under conditions so crowded and hazard-
: oil~ that accidents ••• took a tremendou"s-to1l--{5, P.• 8). 
As time passed, management, reluctantly it seemed at times, began to 
realize that loss of experienced men and valuable equipment due to acci-




not merely humanitarian but also profitable . ('±0, p. 28)1 (5, p, l6~. The 
advent of Workmen's Compensation laws did a great deal to promote safer 
procedures, techniques, and working conditions. ~BQ~~Aee--i-den-ts 
au tho states: 
••• t -he.._pressure of reduced profits d e-t-e-th'!rihJ~ award~ 
based on Workmen I S Comp~a- . n aws and public opinion were 
effective inst ume-n-t-s1.n forcing industry-to-des-tgn -nd _proc-
es~afety in mind. 
Sas long been looked upon as the 'stepchild to common sense atever 'common sense' is in a strict definition(..$_,}' 9~ 
The a p ~ of accidents as acts-of-God to test the cha~;:t~ er of the 
I 
victim, as in the' Biblical story of Job and his persecutrion by the Devil, 
I 
or as retribution for past sins, was long a superstition held even by the 
intellectual elite. This superstition is still quite prevalent a miscon-




Safety was thought to be an individual thing which 
}' 
/ 
was almost personal in nature. Safe't, programs were instituted on this 
idea of common sense and there was lmost no means of evaluating a pro-
gram's effectiveness except on the basis of~ subjective judgment and the ··~._ 
accident trend over long time periods. In 1941, Mr. Vernon Schaefer 
(10, p. 156) stated that up to that time superstition has been a 'formid-
/ 
able opponent' in safety programs and that his only means to evaluate his 
own efforts 'was his experience of some three decades in the industries as 
/ 
a Sjl'-fet y Man. 
As the machines became larger and more complex, the interrelationship 
of workers was realigned so that one worker ' s unsafe activities due to 
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carelessness or lack of common sense effected his co-workers. Management 
and the Government of the United States became interested in safe prac-
tices and their encouraged or enforced use by the working force as minimum 
acceptable standard behavioro Employer Liability Laws were the first 
attempt in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. W.orkm.en.!.s.....CO~n-
Safety Engineers and the President's Industrial Safety Conference have, 
among others, sprung up to become active in promoting 'accident free 
industry' e 
The promotion of safe practices by management or any authority, 
however, was often construed as the restriction of individuals and their 
CJ 
J:.-. 
behavior ,(-l3,-p-.--~. The preventing of the local clown from playing 
practical jokes on fellow workers was considered by the employees as 
management becoming overly restrictive and 'bossy'. When an injury oc-
curred because of the clown's actions, it was only an accident or an act 
of God. The victim was oftentimes merely an object of pity while the 
clown suffered little or no chastisement. 
Case study examinations of safety and accident records changed the 
attitude of that portion of management responsible for safety Jri:r;=··'J>':='"!8)): 
The case studies indicated methods in materials handling, machine opera-
tion~ use of hand tools, minimum standards of behavior on the job, and 
all of the areas of production wherein safer activity would make 
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production more efficient and reduce the accident rate. The case study 
is, however, an expensive and time consuming method of analysis. The 
caus.al factors for individual accidents are oftentimes individual in 
themselves and difficult to categorize for general application. A sub-
jective element is always present when individuals examine historical 
data written by other human beings. The interpretation of secondhand 
accounts leads to possible serious error. The case study method, there-
fore, has serious disadvantages for use as a continuing method for im-
proving present day concepts of what safety is and. how to encourage and 
enforce it. 
The medical profession has developed a great store of data in the 
4 
epidemiological field which has assisted the Safety Engineer·.H:S, 
p~ Unfortunately, the data do not lead to any definitive 
'cause-effect' conclusions because of a lack of adequate and sufficient 
data on the particular individuals involved in the accidents. The 
psychiatric field has also done a great deal in discovering the defects 
in human character traits which affect the individual's attitudes toward 
safety. But, the data are again inconclusive and, therefore, do not lend 
to general application~ 
The unsafe act is the first local step in any accident and is the 
strategic factor upon which the entire scope of industry can operate. 
The medical, psychiatric, and legal aspects of the accident must be left 
to the professionals in their particular field where they can develop 
background for the accident or compensation criteria. Industry is pro-
fessional in its own field and can, thus, operate most efficiently where 
its efforts show the greatest return. The case study has been of value, 
but a more quantitative generally applicable method of analysis must be 
15 
developed which is relatively inexpensive and can be implemented without 
the requirement for highly technical skills. 
Although safety programs in industry have significantly reduced ac-
cidents in comparison with highway and home environments, there is still 
costs in terms of human suffering and lost future potential of the in-
jured worker 1 s capability are immeasurable in terms of money. 
The highway fatality rate is approximately one for every thirty-five 
7 
reported accidents .,C~-,fh--4)_. The industrial accident fatality rate is 
one for every one hundred accidents with the home fatality rate falling 
·between these two extremes (-9-,-p-S-)- hom-p-re-v-:ro'tl's--ot'ttd1:e-s-·by-fr.;""'W"r 
H~i11r:i.ch_J2,_,d_p ... --2.6)_fp,r",.-his-,bo.Qk,,,, ... Ind.usl,;i;-:;ialjic.c.ldent"'Preve,nti.ort.,,,.inj·u:r~y 
~jury accident rates involving the same person occur_,,:~,9-pr,a-irig 
to an expo~~nction of 1:29; 300'1 Lev,, majo·r :inj~;;··~o minor 
---------- ' ' ,,, ,. '' injury to non-injury acciden-t_~"::;:Tnese data concern only fa tali ties or 
_,,.~.,,r: , _,,-c"' -......_....._._,"'•~....,,..,,......,, 
accidents involvingjtte"same person. N~""a:-~ta are available on the haz-
./r·!,S· ~,,,,.,·,~--
1" .............._,__ 
ardous si tuatio,,ni occurring in a time period where --man:y, people are in-
Jf1',J ,.,,...,"",,., ..... , 
/ -valved an9<-·"cross relationships are a geometric progression of-tl:re--number 
.,,. .•.. ,·"' 
of ,p-e'rsons. 
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A less idealistic reason for industry to be concerned about safety 
is in the urging on the part of the courts through Workmenvs Compensation 
liberal interpretation and legislative modifications of the State laws 
take the view that industry and the state should take an a.ctive responsi.= 
/)(. ) 
bility in the interest of the accident victimc, 11~ p. 210. 
managemeJ1l.,Jl;i,-.,P,0ec·,lft.J, .• " Thi1\ is a direct effect on the profi t_:~~yss 
accouri~ and, as indicated by th~bove figures~ can be~.a~-a±gnficiant amount 
even wl~~. the,s·ac·c·id~·rrt frequency-~l .. f~,4;;~s:b:~::":~ld to in the last 
-wcir'~z.t 
,n"·v·-""~f ''-
sev•eral years·., The spending of only relatively few dollars on safety can 
effect substantial sayings. As an example, .the :installation of inexpen-
sive 0 dead-man 1 controls or two handed switches has saved countless limbs 
in the use of machine tools in industry? Uh,.-r-·r.8)·=;· 
When an employee is reassured by machine safety devices, clean and 
well lighted work areas~ and specific personnel who show an interest in 
safety, the employee turns out better and faster work. When interest in 
the individual is shown by the co1t1pany 9 the individual will return this 
interest through his more efficient attitude. This returned interest 
will be indicated in a reduction of U,'1it costs and unit man-hours 
17 
g 
required.,(1!2, PJ?• l::l.0.1. Other costs which can be reduced by safety em-
phasis are in the areas of maintenance of equipment and capital assets~ 
medical expenses, administrative burdens in clerical costs to process the 
paperwork initiated by accidents, and, of course, the compensation for 
the victim. 
Indirectly, there is also a large area of benefits from successful 
safety programs. Personnel morale, the individual employee attitude to-
wards the company and his job, the reduction in required supervisory time 
devoted to investigating the lack of safety and accidents, and a very 
nebulous thing -- the benefits derived from good public relations and the 
public's opinion of the company -- are all indirect benefits which can be 
derived from an effective safety program. 
Accident frequency is reduced to a minimum if unsafe acts~ 
equipment, and situations are ferreted out and eliminated. The accident 
oL.th~-0,pk\~n.ct,,.EE.~s§!..~,,,tb,r.O,.~!tj;_h.§.. .• :WOr.ke,x:.,!,s.-0ha~~~.,.i'J.a·W6"5 1.Jnsaf e 
act, the accident, and the injury itself. As,Ji~~-stI,,e£se.a.,,. the re-
moval of any one of these steps prevents the accident and injury just as 
the removal of one domino in a group of closely aligned standing dominoes 
will make overturning of preceding dominoes in the group ineffective on 
the later ones. The interrelationship of the five steps is very impor-
tant to this study or any study of safety. 
There is not a great deal that industry can manipulate as far as 
the social environment of the worker's ancestry or family today is con-
cerned. Through motivation and education, industry can do some limited 
work in manipulating the worker to improve or modify his attitude and 
;B 
character traits r,(~ ... =-4-:75-ltr,&). In this area 5 there is dangex\, how= 
ever~ where the psychology of man must be considered. The effect of 
manipulation may very well show undesirable traits being mar.d.fested in 
other areas than the one being concentrated upon. This area of manipu= 
lation of man I s character is'! therefore~ ,left in the main to the psychi-
atric field of medicine. 
Industry can concentrate its efforts on the unsafe act as the 
strategic factor to prevent accidents. This area is fairly well defined 
and industry is well within its ju.risdiction in attempting to modify the 
worker's att:'l.tude and behavior within the limits descr:1.bed. 
Because industry is capable of disciplining individu~ls and enforc-
ing procedures through supervisory functions, it is in a u.n.ique posit.:Lon 
for safety effectiveness evaluationo Highway and home safety programs 
depend to a large extent on the goodwill and vv::1..11::1'..ngness of the ind:br:ltd= 
ual for proper implementation and recor(iing of results in an attempt at 
evaluationo Industry is in a better position to requ:tre cooperat::\'..011 9 ar1.d 
impose penalties when the cooperation is not forthcoming. 
The larger companies with large capital investments ru."e the 
pal. leaders in safety emphasiso The Government agencies are 
lowing these large industries and the small companies are rather poor in 
.ct( ) their safety records by comparison .. ],5,;y-f},,_--5- • The reasons for this a:r•e 
probably many and varied w:'Lth exceptions to both extremes and individual 
extenuating circumstances making the delineation rather blu.rr·ed. Howe'vSZ'~ 
in general~ the larger companies have a sufficiently large number o:f 
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employees that 'fringe' services become a necessity and the cost consid-
erations involved establish an emphasis on safe conduct. Larger compa.-
nies are also much more susceptible to the individual's suit in a court 
of law and substantial awards for allowing unsafe conditions are quite 
common today. Economic considerations are probably the greatest impetus 
to safety and its enforcement by management. 
The small company is the struggling one, usually close to the local 
people and employees in an emotional way. As such, the small company is 
not as vulnerable to accident compensation awards as the larger company. 
As a 1family' or team member, there is an intimate closeness and, in most 
cases, the employees assemble to care for their own with the assistance 
of their management. The safety programs are less formal as is the gen-
eral attitude of smaller organizations. This is unfortunate as the small 
t;) 
company suffers a disproportinately high rate of accidenti"C~e-}. 
Whether or not the high accident rate is due to informality is open to 
argument. 
Ex les of organizations with excellent safety records ;\t-e.,,·E:" I. 
""" duPont ..... ~/ Company, Goodrich Tire and Rubber Com.~~Y, and United 
/#',;.}-
States Steel Corpora ·on (2, P• 111). In iti:J,i~.,;t.,..est report to stock-
' .,,,.,"""" 
holders in July 1965, U. ~teel claim..s~io have an accident record one= 
'-.......... ~,-,,,,, 
third that of the steel industr:x;.,,·ruid "t.he steel industry has an accident 
/ ...... , 
,,., ' record one-seventh that of/f;n.e national aver'age for all industry (19). 
,,,-/ "---... 
/ ' . 
Depending on the e;:ca~t limits of the definitions d'\ accident, the means 
,,,/ " of calcul~ng the data, and other parameters, this sb~ement would tend 
~. s. Steel a leader in the practice of good saf~y. 
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Appl~~L be~an its business in the area of ..=::~~!"~~--?-~fety but 
................ ~ .................. ,,_..,,~, ............ _......... .....----~ .. - ..... ~ ..... --..... ,.. ... ~.,.,..-=-~·,....,. 
quickly expand~_JJ1t.0-. .t-he--genera.1-·':tirdustr.y,._~ th emphasis on personal pro~ 
--------tective devices. 
There are few statistical references for the amount of money spent 
on repair or replacement of equipment due to accidents or in~idents. 
Normally, accident statistics reflect only injury data Jlf). Maintenance 
and repair accounting accumulate material repairs in a general mainte-
nance category which does not delineate the cause for the repair. There 
is some justification for this approach in that the accepted definition 
of 9accident' by the American Standards Association specifically limits 
/0 
accidents to areas of personal injury(~ 
The attitude is understandable, however, as statements by management 
concerning dollar costs in equipment in conjunction with safety emphasis 
could lead to misunderstandings as to the company's standards on hQman 
value. The noting of costs in the areas of equipment repair and human 
recovery or medical expenses must then be handled with tact. The amount 
of this cost can be estimated and it would seem that, based on the cost 
estimates which are high, its significance would receive greater emphasis 
in safety program managing. 
The research in the area of industrial safety has~ in general~ taken 
the more rigidly confined area of personal equipmento The establishment 
of techniques and procedures for safety policy in the use of hand tools~ 
machines, and other equipment has received close scrutiny using the case 
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study method on available data. The use of safety glasses, protective 
shoes and hats, 'dead-man' switches, and many other points are examples 
·of the results of this type of safety research. 
There is, however, a large area of potential industrial accidents 
that has been largely overlooked. Because of the possible overlap with 
data developed in the repetitive work cycle studies, or the large scope 
of the non-repetitive work area, safety analysis for this type work has 
been too often limited to generalities. This paper is a step in the 
direction of establishing research procedures for the analysis of long 
time non-repetitive work cycles. There is great difficulty in quantify-
ing the hazards encountered without reaching an unusable number of 
itemized categories very quickly. However, the problem is not insur-




This chapter gives detailed information on the environment encoun ... 
tered in the data gathering. The equipment used, an analysis of the 
industrial sites chosen for the research 9 the establishment of camera 
lense and light relationships, and the problems encountered in the actual 
gathering of data are covered in detail. 
Camera Equipment 
The major equipment used in the development of data for this paper 
was a camera system developed by Professor H. G. Thuesen at Oklahoma State 
University under a National Science Foundation Grant awarded in 1961 (24). 
The camera is rather bulky being 8 .. 5 inches by 7.0 inches by 12.0 inches 
and weighs eighteen pounds (see Figure 1). The 'memo-activity camera 0 is 
an electrically operated sequence camera taking pictures of standard size 
on 16 mm motion picture film with absolute time recorded on each frame at 
the lower left corner. The timer is enclosed in the camera with its own 
power source. The t.imer dial shown on each frame indicates .. 01 minutes~ 
minutes, and hours. 
The camera exposes film at preselected constant intervals of .005~ 
.o4, 0.2, 190, and 2.0 minutes with the additional option of a random 
interval mechanism .. The Oo2 interval was used for the data gathering in 
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Figure 1. Memo-Activity Camera 
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this researcho This gave one picture every twelve seconds and~ -ns:t·ng :tJYJ.e 
hu..'1.dred foot rolls, a time span of some thirteen hours per roll. Each 
frame is exposed for one-thirtieth of a second and is standard for all 
intervals in the timing mechanism. 
A ten millimeter focal length lense was selected,after a pilot study 
using several lenses~ because of the wide variance of activities in the 
area of the camera requiring coverage in the research. The lense opening 
used was also varied in the pilot study and based on the light extremes 
encountered, a 4.0 setting was used for all data gathering. 
The electrical source for the camera is either 110 volt AC~ 60 
cycle, power at a stationary location from the commercial source provided 
in the building~ or~ in a mobile situation, a motor generator system is 
provided. A Carter Motor Company Rotary Converter~ B=l060-CB 9 weighirig 
30 pounds and sized four inches by seven inches by ten inches long~ is 
used to convert a 12 volt DC input to 110 volt AC~ 60 cycle~ power for 
the camera. A twelve volt DC~ wet cell storage battery provides the 11.ec-
essary DC power to the converter. 
Vehicle Equipment 
The camera equipment was mounted on several vehicles to record datao 
A four wheeled tug was first considered due to the type of work involved. 
A tug normally pulls equipment and the majority of its traveling is in 
the forward direction relative to the driver 1 s position. A problem arose~ 
however~ in that the fenders~ which were to serve as the base for the 
camera equipment~ are too exposed to obstacles and personnelo Also~ the 
field of view is highly restricted due to the camera position being too 
low for effective area coverage. This type vehicle was eliminated for the 
above reasons. 
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Fork lifts used in areas where there is overhead activity are usu= 
ally equipped with what is termed the 00 headache rack 00 or a metal protec= 
tion device to protect the driver from falling objectso As the rack is 
above the driver's head, the elevated position provides excellent forward 
and peripheral views of the vehicle environment for camera equipmento 
The mast for elevating loads offers some view restriction for the camera 
but also affords some protection against possible contact with overhead 
objects. A secondary advantage to the fork lift mast is that elevated 
fork activity is viewed and can, therefore~ be evaluated as to operator 
safe practices in conjunction with environmental safetyo The decision to 
use fork lifts as the research vehicle was reached based on the inherent 
advantages in this type of equipment (see Figure 2)6 
The fork lift used at two of the industrial locations had protective 
devices mounted to the fork lift body; whereas~ the third ·;rehfole used a 
rack cantilevered off the mast of the trucko This latter camera mounti.ng 
platform gave no elevation problem as normal travel for the mast pitch is 
limited to a four to six degree movement. However~ the cantilever con-
struction did cause some vibration which was indicated by SS'iteral fl'."ames 
of film being blurredo 
Industrial Sites 
The three industrial sites chosen are all located in Oklahoma Gity~ 
Oklahoma. Each of the three gave access to a particular truck usage in 
that one used the fork lift strictly in a receiving and storage situation 
where truck travel is mainly :restricted to the storage areao The second 
site involved the travel of the fork lift servicing a production line 
area with material from storageo The third site used the fork lift for 





interdepartmental transfer of materials 11JJ..thin the production area. It 
was felt that this gives an adequate coverage of basic uses for the fork 
lift within industry. Two of the sites are government installations and 
the third produces a producer product for use in a further step in con-
sumer goods production. 
In the Oklahoma City area, there is a sufficient use of the indus-
trial truck ranging from two or three large government and private indus-
try facilities to the wholesale grocery situation. The cooperation and 
assistance by the management of all the concerns contacted were excellent 
and lends credence to earlier remarks by the author concerning growing 
management concern in the field of safety. 
The sites chosen for the research are among the elite in the ratings 
by the National Safety Council as to best safety records (7)0 Industries 
in the communications and aircraft fields are well known for their con-
tinued emphasis on safety and, thereby, their excellent safety recordso 
The National Safety Council rates both of these industries at the top of 
their list in lowest injury and lowest injury severity rates. This could 
well be a disadvantage as the accident rate in other industries is higher 
and film analysis might well show substantially more frequent hazard 
occurrence. However, the locations were convenient and the personal con-
tacts available for obtaining the necessary approvals to perform the 
researcho 
In obtaining approvals to enter the plants and take photographs 5 the 
immediate attitude of the higher echelon personnel was enthusiasm~ At 
the next lower echelon 5 extreme conservatism was met; and~ on the lowest 
echelon, where the work was to be performed 9 there was an almost complete 
acceptance of the idea. In general, at the first two levels, these 
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attitudes were likely due to the interest in safety and the cognizan.ce o:f 
the cost data available concerning the individual company's safety record. 
At the lower level, any program which tends to add novelty or new conver-
sation to the daily work is welcomed and this was probably the basis for 
the enthusiasm. 
The selection of the sites used was, thereforej somewhat arbitrary 
as there was no data to use as background to prove the method. As it 
turns out, because the firms used are among the better ones~ by National 
Safety Council evaluation, the justification in favor of the research 
procedure is increased when considering other industries. A research 
method of value where few accidents occur will, by intuition~ be of 
greater assistance where accident frequency is higher. 
Some alternative sites for evaluating the procedure were a depart-
ment store or mail order store warehouse, a wholesale grocery outlet.~ and 
a commercial utility power company. These were eliminated for several 
reasons - the basic one being lack of personal contacts at the time o 
Film and Associated Equipment 
The film used in the research was Kodak~ Tri-Xj TX R449~ Reversal 
Movie Film for 16 mm roll cameras. Five rolls of film were used with 
each roll having one hundred feet of filmo 
One roll of film was exposed as a pilot study to determine the feas= 
ibility of the mounting, the selection of lense and lense opening, and 
the extent of inconvenience to the vehicle drivero This first roll was 
then developed~ analyzed~ and evaluated as to whether or not to continue 
the researcho Due to the clarity and coverage of the film~ plus the 
clearly defined unsafe acts noted in this pilot filmj the research was 
continued. 
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During the course of this pilot study, several lenses and lens,e 
openings were used. Ten millimeter, fifteen millimeter, and twenty-five 
millimeter lenses were used and openings of 2.4, 4.o, 5~6 and 8.o were 
tried on the two smaller focal length lenses; iee•, ten millimeter and 
fifteen millimeter lenses. It was determined that the twenty-five milli-
meter lense was not feasible as the peripheral view was restricted and 
the advantages of clarity at a distance using the lense were cancelled by 
lack of contrast at the lense depth limit. 
Lighting and Vibration Problems 
The ten millimeter lense was finally selected using a ~-oO lense 
opening. This gave a good photograph in over 90 per cent of the film. 
The environmental Yiew with this lense is good and no problems due to 
lack of clarity were encountered. Because the vehicular equipment was 
required to operate several times near exits where strong sunlight was 
admitted~ some of the photographs are over exposed and look washed out. 
However 9 this did not materially affect the safety hazard analysis. At 
the other extreme, when the vehicle entered storage areas where lighting 
is poor and storage is high~ some photographs a.re dark and images are not 
as clear as is perhaps desirable. Here~ there is also no significant ef-
fect on the hazard analysis·. 
One aspect of the filming procedure which did show up on the photo-
graphs was periodic blurring of the film. In one case~ the rot:1.gh surfa.ce 9 
over which the yehicle was traveling, caused blurring. In the second 
case, where the overhead protection for the driver was cru1.-tilevered off 
the mast~ a definite increase in blurred photographs appeared. T}1is 
would appear to be normal based on the weights and moments involved and 
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the small amounts of movement which are magnified at the end of the lever. 
In the third case, there was no significant blurring of the photographs 
except in cases where the vehicle was entering raised areas and encoun-
tered ramps of some sort. The blurring here was not sufficient to de-
stroy the images in the immediate area photographed. 
Miscellaneous Problems 
Probably the most annoying of problems was the time element. The 
author would plan and negotiate for a meeting of necessary personnel to 
clear the project; or a time would be designated for the mounting of the 
equipment. These two items took a seemingly excessive amount of time and 
seldom was the plan met within the limits established. This was~ of 
course~ to be expected but it can be annoying. 
A second minor problem was the continuing efforts of local super= 
visory personnel to expand the scope of the project. Based on the indi-
vidual1s background and experience~ each had a personal addition to make 
to voround out 01 the project. Several of these ideas had merit and are 
discussed in the final chapter to this paper as areas for further study. 
There were other minor annoyances~ 'but these could not be directly 
attributed to the research projecto 
Sequence of Filming Operations 
As discussed above~ the pilot film was obtained first during the 
early portion of August, 1965. The equipment was installed and run con-
tinuously from mid-morning to the end of the day shift at 4~00 o 1 clock in 
the afternoon. Throughout this period~ lenses and lense openings were 
varied as was the frame exposure :intervaL As was further discussed~ a 
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ten millimeter lense with a 4.o lense opening was decided upon. wi.th the 
camera operating at one frame every twelve seconds. 
Three weeks after the first 1 or pilot., study the camera was set up 
for an eight hour operation at Site Noc 2. Film was exposed all day. 
Research was begun at 8:45 A. Mc and continued until 12:00 noon at an in-
creased exposure rate -- o.4 minutes or one frame every 2o4 seconds. 
This was a mistake by the author made during the mounting of the camera. 
The roll of film was then used up in three hours and a second roll was 
installed for the afternoon work period§ The interval was reduced to the 
desired 0.2 minutes for the afternoon work period. 
Several days later~ the third roll of film was used again at a third 
industrial site. No fu.rther problems were encountered. The last thirty 
feet of this third roll of film were used with the camera mounted on a 
bridge crane positioned over a l:tj.gh density traffic aisle at the site of 
the pilot film study. 
The fourth roll of film was run at Site No. 2~ accumulating one 
week 9 s data. Due to the significance of the data gathered in August~ the 
staff at the Industrial Engineering School felt that a random sample of 
work hours would give a better statistical foundation. for conclusions 
drawn. Random periods of one hour increments were selected and a desig= 
nated man~ detailed by the management~ started and stopped the camera on 
this schedule6 This procedure was followed at two of the sites i;o get 
some statistically based sampling of the work rather than one day's con-
tinuous film. The procedure was not followed at the third site as the 
original film indicated insufficient activity to warrant additional study~ 
The film based on a sampling of one week 0 s activity gave excellent results 
to further validate the preliminary data9 The fifth and last roll of film 
was also used in this sampling manner. 
The film was developed by a local radio stationj Station WKY 5 which 
had the only commercial facilities for the development of 16 mm movie 
film. Using a Kodak °'Analyst 00 sixteen millimeter movie projector~ Model 
BP 16AR as modifed by L. W. Photo., Inc., Van Nuys, California, the film 
was projected at a slow rate and the safety hazards itemized. A rate of 
about five frames per second allows sufficient time to absorb the photo-
graph and react to stop the projector on a single frame when further 
study is desired. 
Safety hazards were then categorized by defined class and an analy-
sis made as to the success of the research and the value of the procedure. 
The subsequent chapters to this study give the details of the analy-
sis and the conclusions drawn. 
CHAPTER IV 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This portion of the study presents the methods used in analyzing 
the data gathered. The use of statistics to organize the data, the 
categorizing and charting of data, and the analysis of the results are 
included in this mathematical portion of the worko The conclusion to the 
chapter discusses a possible relationship for accidents and hazards. 
Control Chart Concept 
Life exists within an environment of many variables. These vari-
ables may act randomly or conform to a pattern. Some are chance and 
others are caused by controllable factors. The chance categories of 
variables are subject to statistical isolation with a view to establish-
ing limits within which these chance variables may operate and not cause 
undue alarm,the majority of the time. Chance causes are not predictable 
with certainty, but limits may be established on the basis of probability. 
Those areas of variation which are due to controllable factors a.re desig-
nated the 'assignable causev variables. These are due to such elements 
as careless or unskilled workmanship, substandard raw material~ equipment 
breakdown, or any of a number of other reasons. These are preventable or 
correctable and a~e not due to chance. 
Statistical quality control methods employ 1control limits 1 between 
which the measured parameters of a sample must fall to consider the 
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sample 'in control'. This control area accounts for the chance variables 
occurring randomly in any situation about which nothing can effectively 
or economically be done. The over-all summation of chance variables 
causes a dimension to vary, a defect to occur, or a safety hazard to be 
caused on a random basis. When a sample measurement falls outside the 
control limit area, it may well be due to randomness; however, there 
could be a definable fault requiring the reaction of the responsible 
authorities to get the situation back 'in control 1 o 
A control chart is a chronological history of samples as measured 
according to the desired parameters. The e~tablishment of control 
limits for the chart are based on the experiences of management, an 
arbitrary selection, or the economic relationships involved. Close con-
trol limits are more costly because each sample outside the limits set 
requires investigation as to why it is different. The reason may be due 
to the chance variables accumulating to give an out of control situation 
rather than a definable cause. The closer the limits, the more often 
this will happen. Wider limits, on the other hand, cause acceptance of 
samples which are slightly defective due to definable faults. The eco-
nomics of the limits are, logically then, a factor in setting their 
extent. 
Statistical Approach 
The wide area and scope of activities photographed in the research 
indicated that an attribute inspection or number of hazards noted was the 
statistical measurement parameter required for this analysis. In a 
quality control analogy~ this analysis would correspond to the method of 
summing the defects noted as opposed to the fraction defective method 
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where the total number of possible defects is known, No one could possi-
bly determine with accuracy the total number of possible hazards that 
occur in one time peri.od where a working force of several thousand are 
employed, Because of this~ the analysis could not enumerate the hazards 
noted by photographing and state that the number was a percentage of the 
total number of hazards possible, The number of hazards increases with 
the number of man-hours and employees and~ therefore~ a parameter of the 
man-hours involved is the common denominator for the analysis. 
Duncan ~25, p, 350) states that experience with numbers of defects 
in a sample unit of a universe will closely follow the Poisson distribu-
tion form. The basis for assigning this mathematical form to hazard 
occurrence is strictly on intuitive grounds because it is impossible to 
collect data to 
for the Poisson 
establish the form on an empirical basis, The formula · 
I ( c -c 
distribution is P(c) = c ; where c is the number of c. 
defects in a sample consisting of a single unit and c 1 is the aver~e 
number of defects per unit for the universe. When the total universe 
cannot be defined from the view of possible defects~ the Poisson form may 
still be used on the empirical basis that it apparently describes situa= 
tions adequately to justify its use. Each of the research sites is con= 
.sidered to be a population as of itself. This is based on the fact that 
no two industrial sites have the same environment and though human nature 
may act in an over-all similar manner~ the varying environment of the in= 
dustry sites will effect a significant difference in the resulting human 
actions. Differences such as climatic conditions, lighting conditions, 
aisle dimensions~ equipment use, and location will affect a delineation 
into separate populations, As a statistical proof of this, see the chi= 
square tests below. 
The inspection universe then is the ind~vidual research site where 
data was gather~d. Within.each O:t'ganization, however, this unit mll$t be 
defined further on the basis of a common denominator or unit of measure. 
The truck may travel a c;ertain number of miles within the plant, or · 
remain within specific a):'ea boundarie~, or encounter specific similar 
situations~ As the primary interest in this study is the actions of 
people, the natural common denominator is the person and the number of 
hours he or sh~.works during th~ research. Ea.ch site is, therefore, 
defined on the basis of the number of thousands ot man-hours worked in 
the departments through which t~e true~ traveled; and where the camera 
might, therefore, photograph an unsafe act. The site breakdown by labor 
force and man-hours is listed :tn Tal;>le I. 
'l'AiLE I 
OPERATIONAL MAN·HOURS DURING THE ~ESEARCH 
.... : .. - ... ·. . .... ·,.:. · .... , .... 
Site No. l .. - .. 1,.500 employees·· 
Site No. 2,... - ~1+100 ·employees 







As ~oted in Table I, the three industrial i;;ites used for the re-
sear9h, and photographic sampling methods did not involve the same size 
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sample of personnel and did not involve the same period of time (see 
Table V). Therefore, since samples are not equal, a U chart is indicated 
as the required recording technique to establish guidelines for each uni-
verse or population (25, p. 356). The U chart has the advantage of com-
paring unequal samples through the use of a common mean, u, and individual 
control limits for each sample size. 
Upper and lower control limits (UCL and LCL) are established by 
formula (25, P• 355): 
3 fU/k 
"-~ UCL = u +. ~u;<k 
LCL = u - V 31:i/k. 
By definition, the :Poisson distribution variance is equal to the mean of 
the population being analyzed. If control limits are established on the 
basis of three times the square root of this variance added to or sub-
tracted from the population mean1 less than one per cent error will be 
made in detection of defective out-of-control samples. There will be a 
corresponding large probability of accepting a sample which is slightly 
defective due to cause, but not accepting a good sample will be at a 
probable minimum. The selection of the limits can be based on any de-
sired multiple of the variance, but it is common practice to use the 
third multiple. In this way, 50 per cent of the chance variations will 
fall above or below the mean based on randomness. Limits may be estab-
lished in the above manner or on the basis of probability of error such 
as one per cent error chance, five per cent error, or any figure chosen 
by the using authority.· For this study, however, the common practice of 
three times the square root of the variance will be used to determine the 
control limits. 
The term 'k' is used to place the samples at any one site on a com-
mon basis. In this study, the 'k' is based on the number of man-hours 
worked at the site for which the control limits are being established. 
Thus, the 'k' varies for each site and research period, and is the factor 
used to weigh unequal samples in order to establish a common reference 
for purposes of comparison. 
The u is common to all samples at one site and based upon the sum of 
hazards noted divided by the number of hazards for some unit of measure -
in this study, the number of hazards for each one thousand man-hours 
worked during the time period. The control limits are then established 
as listed in Table VI using the above formulas. Because the data was 
gathered in three separate methods; i.e., individual eight hour periods 
of photographing at each site, ten randomly chosen one hour periods of 
photographing at each site, and a stationary camera location, tables are 
listed for each method. Charts are drawn for the individual site, how-
ever, and not drawn for the individual method of photography. 
Category Definition 
The defects noted in a quality control situation are analogous to 
the safety hazards in this study. A defect is anything causing a deteri~ 
oration in the operat!on of a product. The safety hazard is a personal 
act or existing situation encompassing a source of danger. (See Chapter 
I, Definition of Terms.) The definition is necessarily broad and the 
establishment of specific subordinate categories is necessary in order to 
facilitate the enumeratione 
The establishing of categories requires a qualitative analysis as to 
the lack of safety involved in a personal act or situation. In many 
instances, such as traffic rule violations, the categorizing of unsafe 
situations is facilitated by already established criteria. These crite-
ria could be State and/or Federal laws or regulations imposed on the 
basis of analyses of past performance in similar situations. The diffi-
culties in defining the safety hazard are manifested in the cases of 
marginal situations where perhaps the degree of jeopardy is minimal. An 
example of this would be an object projecting into the aisle right-of-way 
a small amount versus a large object protruding into the aisle a suffi-
cient amount to alter the flow of traffic. This particular hazard is 
discussed below. The point here is that often the qualitative evaluation 
causes the major impediments in defining category guidelines. 
The unsafe practices causing safety hazards were divided into three 
categories: 
l. Static conditions - An existing situation where safe prac-
tices are being violated and personnel or vehicles in 
motion are not directly involved. 
2. Vehicular motion,- Vehicles violating traffic rules estab-
lished by vehicle manufacturers, local company policy, or 
other accepted authority. 
3. Personnel actions - Actions by individual personnel 
violating safe practices not involving operation of 
vehicles. 
These categories are then further sub-divided into areas directly asso-
ciated with this research study (see Table II, page 42), 
In the first category, the static condition would exist for some 
time and personnel are not in evidence as attempting to modify or pre-
vent the hazard from causing an accident. An example of this would be an 
40 
object projecting into the aisle. The object could be anything from the 
lip or a portion of a trash receptacle to a loaded skid or pallet stand-
ing in the aisle right-of-way. There is very likely a distinction to be 
made here for minor and major hazard potential. However, a trash recep-
tacle could be struck, fall over, and roll across or strike an employee's 
limb and cause a major injury; whereas, a loaded pallet could be struck a 
glancing blow and little or no injury result. On this basis, then, all 
protrusions into the aisle were considered hazardous without attempting 
to establish a distinction as to the degree of hazard. 
A distinction as to hazard degree could possibly be made on a meas-
uring scale. The object's protrusion into the aisle could be defined on 
the basis of quantity on a line normal to the aisle limit line. The 
establishing of degree of jeopardy would again be an arbitrary decision 
and an endeavor towards this end is outside the scope of the work. 
In the second category, above, the violations of traffic rules in-
volving moving traffic are based on accepted standard traffic rules-of-
the-road as specified by the National Safety Council, safety rules as 
published by the "American Standard Safety Code for Powered Industrial 
Trucks'\ ASA B56.1 dated 1959, and any special rules published by the 
individual research site governing the movement of traffic. An example 
of this latter rule occurred at Site No. 2: Vehicle drivers are in~ 
structed not to travel through areas where other employees are on 
9coffee-break'. The photographs indicated that violations of this rule 
are not uncommon. 
The unsafe acts of employees whose work is not associated with 
vehicular operation are listed in the third category. Even though sev-
eral of these hazards would probably involve vehicles if an accident 
occurred, the hazard was attributed to the person performing the unsafe 
act. A specific example of this is the case at Site No. 2 where a jani-
tor had his cleaning equipment and a trash receptacle cover sufficiently 
arrayed in a traffic aisle to cause a traffic hazard. The subordinate or 
detailed groups under each of the three categories are as in Table II. 
The groupings (on the following page) are based on the research 
performed and apply to the industries photographed only. In other indus-
tries, the specific groups may require additional delineation or modified 
definition for inclusion of specific data. 
Calculations and Charts 
The frequency of the individual hazard as defined above is noted in 
Tables III and IV. Table III lists the Safety Hazard Frequency based on 
the individual one shift photography at each site with the final column 
of the table listing the Hazard Frequency when the camera was mounted in 
a stationary position over the high density traffic aisle. Table IV 
lists the Safety Hazard Frequency for the random interval photography at 
each site. 
Table V lists the accumulated frequencies from the above mentioned 
tables plus the number of employees at each site, the number of hours re-
search done at each site, the number of man-hours under research~ and the 
hazards per one thousand man-hours. The table is in three parts to dis= 
tinguish the three photographic methods used. Table VI, then~ breaks the 
Table V into the research site categories and establishes mean values of 
-The Control Limit Meanj u, is calculated by dividing the total of 
the hazards noted by the total number of hazards per each one thousand 






A. Object projecting into the aisle. 
B. Items stored in racks/bins piled too high or 
in such a manner to be in danger of falling 
into the aisle. 
Violation of traffic rules. 
A. Motor vehicles. 
1. Improper passing of moving vehicle. 
2. Traveling on wrong side of two-way aisle. 
3. Failure to yield right-of-way at an 
intersection or 'Break Area 1 • 
4. Traveling the wrong way on a one-way 
aisle. 
5. Fork truck trav·eling an unreasonable 
distance with elevated load. 
6. Personnel working on elevated and u..YJ.-
protected forks. 
7. Improper loading of vehicle. 
B. Non-powered vehicles. 
1. Improper passing of moving vehicles. 
2. Load obstructs view in direction of 
motion. 
3. Traveling wrong way on one-way aisles. 
4. Traveling on wrong side of two-way aisle. 
Category III -- Personnel actions. 
A. Employee obstructing aisle with the major 
portion of his body. 
B. Employee walking with armload obstructing 
view in direction of motion. 
C. Violation of smoking safe practices. 
D. Employee obstructing right-of-way unnecessarily 
with tools and/or equipment. 
E. Improper riding on truck. 
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TABLE III 
SAFETY HAZARD FREQUENCY 
(FILM ANALYSIS= SINGLE SHIFT CONTINUOUS PHOTOGRAPHY) 
Site No .1. 
Site Stationary 
No •. L No. , 2 No. 3 Photography 
Category I Static conditions 
causing safety 
hazard. 
A. Objects projecting 
into the aisle 10 57 5 15 
B. Improper storing of 
items in racks/bins. 2 12 
Sub-Total 10 59 17 15 
Category II Traffic rule violation. 
A. Motor vehicles. 
l. Improper passing 
of vehicle 1 1 
2. Traveling on 
wrong side of 
two-way aisle l 
3. Failure to yield 
right-of=way at 
an intersection 
or u break area' • 2 '? 2 
4. Traveling wrong 
way on 1 one-way 0 
aisle. 4 6 
5. Fork truck travel.,, 
ing unreasonable 
distance with 
elevated load. 4 
6. Personnel working 
on elevated and 
unprotected forks. l 
7. Improper loading 
of truck. 3 3 
B. Non=powered vehicles. 
1. Improper passing 
of moving 
vehicles. 2 4 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
B. (Continued) 
2. Load obstructs 
view in direc-
tion of motiono 
3. Traveling 
wrong way on 
one-way aisle. 
Sub-Total 
Category III - Personnel unsafe acts 
not directly involvi'ng 
vehicles. 
A. Employee obstruct-
ing aisle with 
major portion of 
his body. 
B. Employee with arm= 
load obstructing 
view in direction 
of motion. 
C. Smoking near fuel 
tank opening 
D. Employee obstruct= 
ing aisle 1.mneces= 
sarily with tools 
and/or equipment. 





No. 1 No. 2 NO@ 3 
l 3 
4 

















SAFETY HAZARD FREQUENCY 
(FILM ANALYSIS - 10 RANDOM HOURLY INTERVALS) 
Static conditions causing 
safety hazard. 
A. Objects projecting into 
the aisle. 








Sub-Total 157 76 
Traffic rule violation. 
A. Motor vehicles. 
1. Improper passing of 
moving vehicle. 4 
2. Traveling on wrong side 
of two-way aisle. 2 2 
3. Failure to yield right-
of-way at an intersec-
tion or vbreak area'. 1 
4. Traveling wrong way on 
1 one-way 1 aisle. 13 
5. Fork truck traveling 
unreasonable distance 
with elevated load. 
6. Personnel working on 
elevated and unprotected 
forks. 
7. Improper loading of truck. 1 
B. Non-powered vehicles. 
1. Improper passing of 
moving vehicle. 
2. Load obstructs view in 
direction of motion. l 
3. Traveling wrong way on 
one-way aisle. 15 
Sub-Total 37 2 
No. 3 
4,6 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Site 
Noo l No. 2 No. 3 
Category III - Personnel unsafe acts not 
directly involving vehicles. 
A. Employee obstructing aisle 
with major portion of his 
body. 4 2 
B. Employee with armload ob-
structing view in direction 
of motion. 
c. Smoking near fuel tank 
opening. 
D. Employee obstructing aisle 
unnecessarily with tools 
and/or equipment. 
E. Improper riding on truck. 
Sub-Total 4 2 
















SAFETY HAZARDS PER 1000 MAN-HOURS 
Research Man-Hours Total 
&nployees Hours Researched Hazards 
Continuous One Shift Photogra;eh;y: 
1500 6 9000 26 
1100 7 7700 83 
100 7 700 25 
Random Interval Photogra;ehi 
1500 10 15000 198 
1100 10 11000 80 








3 450~ 33 
TABLE VI 
MEAN VALUES 



















Table VII, then, establishes the 'k' value and the control limits 
for each site or research area. The 'k' is dependent upon the number of 
emplo;yee man-hours worked by the personnel at the individual plant during 
the research time. Each one thousand man-hours is considered to be one 
unit of 1k 1 • The 'k' values are then calculated as follows for each site 
depending on the amount of time the research was being done: 
CONTINUOUS PHOTOGRAPHY VALUES OF 1k 1 
Site No, l. k1 = 9000/1000 = 9. 0 
Site No. 2. k2 = 7700/1000 = 7.7 
Site No. 3. k 3 = 700/1000 = .7 
RANOOM PHOTOGRAPHY VALUES FOR 'k' 
Site No. 1. k.i = 15,000/1000 = 15.,0 
Site No., 2. k5 -· 11,000/1000 = 11.0 
Site No. 3. Not Applicable. 
STATIONARY PHOTOGRAPHY VALUES FOR 1k 1 
Site No. 1. ks = 4500/1000 = 4.5 
The Hazard Pattern Charts, TI charts (Figure 3-a through c), are then 
drawn using the control limits from Table VII (following page) and the 
mean, u, for each site found in Table VI (preceding page). The abscissa 
and the ordinate for the charts are the sample numbers and the number of 
hazards found for each one thousand man-hours under research. These 
Hazard Pattern Charts present,in a usable format, the relative safety of 
an organization. The application of this information is discussed in 
Chapter V. 
A.· SITE NO .• I 
~14 















B. SITE NO. II 
. . . . ' 
·· . .-......--.., -··-~ 
010.a ii = 9.0 
-. ..... .--...· 
O. SITE NO. III 
Figure 3. Hazard Pattern, u, Charts 
TABLE VII 
CONTROL LIMIT VALUES 
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Research Method k 3Vtr/k UCL = tr + 3VIT/k LCL = u - 3V ii/k 
SITE NO. l 
Continuous 9 2.7975 10.60 5.01 
Random 15 2.1645 9.97 5o64 
Stationary 4.5 3.9495 11.76 3.86 
SITE NO. 2 
Continuous 7.7 3.2544 12.28 5.77 
Random 11.0 2.7195 11.75 6.31 
SITE NO. 3 
Continuous .7 21.4299 57.14 14.28 
Results 
-The U charts each have a central line, u, which is the expected num~ 
ber of safety hazards during any period of one thousand man-hours of work. 
The expected hazard frequencies found in this research average out to: 
7.9 for Site No. 1, 9.03 for Site No. 2, and 35.71 for Site No. 3. 
The above are the quantitative results of the research and the first 
step in the research method being proposed. In order to establish a sta= 
tistical delineation for these results~ the chi-square testing technique 
has been applied to make decisions on the following hypotheses: 
Ho. No. 1: The samples from all the sites and using all 
methods of photography are taken from the same 
population. 
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Ho. No. 2: The samples taken at Site No. 1 are from the 
Ho. No. 3: The samples taken at Site No. 3 are from tht 
same population. 
Table VIII lists the hypotheses by number and the decision for each based 
on the chi-square test. 
TABLE VIII 
CHI-SQUARE TEST: SIMILARITY OF POPULATION 
Ho: No. of Samples Calculated X2 Tabular X2 Ho; Decision 
1. 6 173.124 12.8 Reject 
2. 3 6.851 5.9 Reject 
3. 2 .6811 3.84 Accept 
Source: (45, P• 451) 
The rejection of Hypothesis No. 2 is the only one in dispute based 
on intuitive grounds. The first sample at Site Noe 1 was taken just 
prior to a long holiday weekend and the safety program was emphasizing 
'Be Safe'. In the author's opinion, this program materially affected 
the hazard frequency and further sampling during normal work times would 
establish a single universe at Site No. 1. No chi-square test was run on 
the third site as the degree of freedom becomes 10 1 with only one sample. 
The test, therefore, becomes of no value. 
5,; ..:. 
Analysis 
There are some variations in the data for 'Which explanations are re-
quired in the opinion of the author. This section will explain these 
variations and discuss the results. 
In the first place, the relatively high rate of safety hazards at 
Site No. 3 of 35.71 hazards per one thousand man-hours is due to two 
things in this study. One, the establishing of hazard categories is a 
subjective analysis of safety and if the site authorities do not consider 
a practice unsafe while an evaluator does consider it unsafe~ a contra-
diction in judgment results. In the author's opinion, this situation was 
most apparent at this site and the high rate of hazard occurrence is the 
result. A subjective analysis such as this must be submitted to proper 
authority for decision. Second, the environment at Site No. 3 is signif-
icantly different from the other two being limited to storage of materiel 
only. No production facilities are present and the labor force is much 
lower in number. Thus, there appear to be logical reasons for the dif-
ferences in frequency. 
A second area of data variation is in the number of samples. The 
research method requires additional data in repeated samples to establish 
with certainty the limits on the U charts and the hazard frequency for 
the individual site. However, this study was initiated to prove the fea= 
sibility of such a procedure and not to set up definite quantities for 
the charts. Confirmation of control limits and hazard frequencies will 
require many samples if the method is acceptable as being of use to the 
company. The varying hazard frequency among the various sites may well 
be based on the relative emphasis on safety at the sites or on the 
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attitude of the employees toward safety. This is an argumentative poiri.t 
and stated here as a possible explanation for this variation. 
There was an expected difference in the occurrence of hazards among 
the several methods of photography sampling used. At Site No. 2j however~ 
the enumeration results were almost equal for unequal time periods of 
seven hours for the continuous sample versus ten hours of random sampling. 
There is no obvious significance to this fact except that there was a 
decrease in safety hazards perpetrated when employees realized the possi= 
bility of being photographed in the act. This realization could make a 
person more conscious of his actions and modify them accordingly. Based 
on conversations with supervisory and Industrial Relations personnel~ 
this reaction very likely took place. 
An 'Expected Accident Criterion~ Theory 
In industry~ there is, effectively~ no recognition of the nincident' 
in present-day statistics. In Heinrich's ratio of 1:29:300~ as discussed 
in Chapter II~ the incident was apparently of some concern. It follows 
then that if the incident is of some importance where one person is con= 
cerned~ it becomes of far greater importance where personal relationships 
are a geometric function of the number of employees and the number of 
hazards are much more frequent. There is evident a void in the statis= 
tical concepts of Safety. This study has concentrated on the safety 
hazard which is a further step beyond the occurrence of the incident~ 
assuming that there is a functional relationship among the accidents~ 
incidentsi and hazards. If the assumption of relationship is made and 
accepted as a premise~ then a quantitative relationship may be proposed 
whereby incident statistics are circumvented and a ratio of accidents to 
hazards may be of value in the prediction of accident frequencies from 
samples of hazard frequency. 
Through the use of available data at each industrial site used in 
the research, the accidents occurring at each site during the period 
July, August, and September are listed. From these data and the hazard 
frequency data obtained by the research, an 'Expected Accident Criterion' 
can be established. See Table IX (on the following page). Th.is parame-
ter is a ratio of the accidents per one thousand man-hours to the safety 
hazards enumerated per one thousand man-hours for a stated period of 
analysis time. A quarterly time period was selected based on the fact 
that the climatic environment is rather constant for the research sites 
and, more significantly, accident occurrence is rather infrequent. This 
necessitates a time period longer than a month in order to approach a 
'leveling' of the data. 
Acceptance of this reasoning leads to the theory that a prognostica-
tion of accident frequency is plausible. By establishing hazard frequen= 
cy in a time period through the use of this researohj the accident 
expectation can be calculated as a function of the established 
'Criterion' • 
A great deal of further study is required on this theory and many 
samples of hazard frequency are needed to correlate with accident data to 
prove the functional relationship and establish conclusions. However~ 
the rationale is not incongruous with the present data. 
Site Man-Hours Worked 
Noo July August September 
1. 241,920 253,440 230',400 
2. 670,,760 703,,560 737,,880 




Total July August September 
725,760 . 47 .57 49 
2,112,200 424 350 494 




















The collection and organization of data is the facilitated portion 
of this research method in that the required judgment and qualitative 
analysis using the results of the quantitative analysis cause the greater 
difficulties. The value of the data collected depends on its use. The 
data itself is not an end, but a more quantified means of guiding safety 
program implementation and emphasis than has heretofore been used. Thus, 
the end is a better means to safety program guidance. This chapter dis-
cusses the uses of this quantitative data in consideration of specific 
objectives. 
The Safety Program 
The preceding chapter proves the feasibility of enumerating the 
safety hazards in any industry. Through the use of established analysis 
techniques, a chart may be devised which graphically demonstrates the 
historical relationship of the hazard frequencies. In this manner, safe-
ty program frequency and emphasis may be adjusted more readi:J,.y :than·: l?Y 
awaiting accident statistics to show trends. 
For example, a plant safety group in using this procedure may note 
that the Hazard Pattern Chart records the latest samples as consistently 
above the mean, ii. An analysis of this time period may reveal an exces-
sive number of objects in aisle right-of-ways, or vehicle operators 
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continually operating in violation of some traffic rule. The safety 
personnel then place particular emphasis on these two hazards in the pro-
gram of safety until the hazards reduce in frequency. 
The specificness of the safety program in its emphasis on particular 
hazards, as compared to a general "Be Safe" program is the importance of 
this method. 
The safety program has had, in the repetitive work cycle, a statis-
tical record of specific injuries due to rather easily defined hazards. 
Many of these resulting "Safe Practices", such as hard hats and safety 
glasses, are applicable to the long work cycle, but there is a large area 
of hazard where the Safety Engineer has depended upon generalities in the 
program of safety emphasis. The safety program can be specific in the 
long time nonrepetitive activity cycle by means of this research method. 
The Individual 
The personnel photographed are normally recognizable as to name and 
department. Therefore, individuals responsible for unsafe acts or respon-
sible for the area where an unsafe condition exists may be identified. 
This photographic evidence can be used by supervision to realign the 
individual's attitude as necessary or apply penalties where required. 
Photographic evidence is, by its very nature, difficult for an offender 
to contradict or evade. 
An individual who consistently is responsible for unsafe behavior is 
very likely to have a record of accidents. Photographic evidence may 
lead to causes and the assistance necessary to help the individual. 
The individual, on seeing himself in photography, is his own best 
critic. It is known that the individual feels a detachment and sees 
himself as a part of the whole when he views himself in pictures (20). 
If the film from this method is shown to groups of employees, they can 
better critique the hazards and much can be gained from the employees 
themselves. 
Evaluation of Safety 
In industry, the majority of innovations to the organization, the 
production process, or any of the various facets of industry are evalu-
ated on~the basis of efficiency increase or reduction in actual cost to 
the company. The evaluation is on the basis of operations prior to and 
after the innovation, Thus, efficiency or the dollar saved is the cri-
teria•.for judgment. 
Safety program evaluation differs from this in that the criteria is 
a decrease in accidents, though accident freq~ency reduction can be 
equated to dollar value. Normally, a safety program takes effect over a 
long period of time and the trend in accidents cannot be directly attrib= 
uted to the safety program alone. Over time, there are other parameters 
which could affect a change in the accident frequency. As examples of 
other parameters, people seem to be more safety conscious in winter time 
or just prior to a holiday period. To get the value of a safety program 
under present criteria, then, takes a long period of time. In automotive 
traffic safety, for example, the safety program evaluation takes several 
years. 
Because of the intuitive relationship of unsafe act and accident, a 
reduction in the hazard frequency would appear to effect a reduction in 
accidents also. The use of the research method,herein evolved, could 
establish a hazard frequency prior to a safety program initiation. 
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Immediately subsequent to the program or after a period of program opera-
tion, a second survey to re-establish the hazard frequency would 1 with 
all other things being equal, tend to the conclusion that the program had 
a deleterious or beneficial effect on the attitude of the employees. The 
need to initiate such a program during 'normal' times to, as far as pos-
sible, prevent biasing of the results is apparent. In this manner, other 
parameters,which could bias the outcome based on time, are reduced to a 
minimum since they have little time to take effect. 
The frequency of safety programs and their emphasis can be estab-
lished by their effect on the employees. Since the time element is re= 
duced to a minimum by talcing immediate measurements, an effective 
evaluation can be made. 
Accident Agencies and Causes 
Nowhere in industry or other phase of society has there been a 
direct relationship proven between accident frequency and hazard fre-
quency. There may well be a completely different mathematical distribu= 
tion of accidents superimposed on the assumed Poisson distribution of 
hazards. Intuitively, it is felt that accidents are a direct function of 
hazards, but it is unproveno 
No accidents were photographed during the course of this research 
work and, thus, no cause or agency of accidents can be alluded to with 
certainty. Though on the basis of the "Law of Averages 00~ a person will 
suffer injury if endangered in the same manner, frequently, there is in-
sufficient data in this work to establish this and analyze accident 
agency or cause. The 'Expected Accident Criterion° developed in Chapter 
IV is a theory which, though intuitively rational~ requires a large 
60 
amount of data to prove conclusively. 
Therefore, no firm application of this criterion can be alluded to 
in this research except on the theoretical basis of potentiality. 
Multiple Hazard Pattern Charts 
As an extension of the present concept, control charts could be 
established for individual hazards such as objects projecting into the 
aisle or a particular unsafe act noted often enough to warrant individual 
treatment. The individual treatment would be initiated when accident 
trend analyses indicated a high accident rate apparently due to one or 
more hazards. The establishing of these charts would require justifica-
tion on the basis of accident trends because of the multiplicity of pos-
sible hazards and the potential pap~rwork resulting from a chart for 
every hazard. 
Inherent Conditions of Hazard 
The photographic study indicated an important corollary to the dis-
cussion. This corollary concerns the situations created by the architect, 
engineer, or planner for a site which are inherently unsafe. Layout of 
machinery, location of equipment, or service equipment which force the 
operator to perform his wor~ in an unsafe manner are examples of possible 
'built-in' hazards. At one of the research sites, pay telephones are 
provided for the employees. They are not enclosed, but are in a shell 
arrangement which forces the user to stand in the transportation aisle. 
This is an inherent hazard though, as yet, there are no accidents re-
corded due to the hazard. This last statement is not confirmed by a 
research of the accident reports~ but stated on the basis of conversation 
with the safety personnel. 
The film records establish the hazard and how it occurs without 
members of management having to be present at the moment a hazard is 
evident. This type of hazard is manifested clearly and management can 
then concentrate on how to eliminate it. 
Information Models 
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Symbolic or schematic models have been used extensively by many 
fields of study to represent reality. Their value lies in representa-
tion of reality in cooperation with the abstract for illustrating rela= 
tionships. Information models illustrate the relationship and use of 
information as it first is recognized in raw data form and proceeds to 
be digested for the decision making process and finally put to use in 
modifying reality over time. 
Comparative models of the flow of safety information, considering 
input and output of data~ indicates the value of quantifying as perma-
nent evidence the safety hazard reports as proposed in this study. In 
the first model, input information is recognized through subjective 
judgment of personnel evaluating the occurrence of safety hazards or 
accident report analysis. The observance of a safety hazard is not re-
corded except by individual observation and no record is kept as to any 
frequency of occurrence. Under present normal industrial operations~ 
this safety hazard data may or may not be used to guide safety program 
implementation. Much of the safety program direction is a result of 
accident trend analysis; thus, the programs may well lag accident trends 
over time. Thus, the data output in the present situation model may be 
of little value depending on the time and subjective judgment parameter 


















Hazards or accident reports. 
Individual sees hazard or reads 
accident report. 
Deduces potential accident or 
causes of reported accident • 
Knowledge of hazard frequency 
unavailable and other parameters 
then effect choice of Safety 
emphasis. 
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Output No positive method for evaluating 
, efforts. 
The above model indicates that the second, third, and fourth steps 
are activated by mental processes of safety personnel and are, thus, 
subject not only to the individual's experience and performance, but also 
to the individual's highly variable mental response to external stimuli. 
There is no 'feedback' signal to the input which would serve as an evalu-
ation of any effort, expended in areas of particular unsafe conditions. 
A model of information flow for the procedure proposed in this 


















Feedb ck Signal 
Description 
Hazards or accidents. 
Photographic data and enumeration, 
categorization of hazards 
Decision on emphasis of safety 
program. 
Modified safety program as 
required. 
Changes in hazard frequency. 
The substitution of an objective quantitative step in the model for 
the subjective sensing of hazards reduces the probability of human fail-
ure to overlook problem areas by a significant amount. The addition of a 
'feedback' signal to the model as proposed in completion of the communi~ 
cation cycle gives a positive evaluation of the man-man linkage found in 
the promotion of safety at the industrial operation. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this last chapter, a summary of the research and results is pre-
sented along with the conclusions reached and areas of possible further 
research which appear to need study. 
Summary 
The study, herein, performed under the direction of Dr. Earl J. 
Ferguson, at Oklahoma State University, establishes a basis for analyzing 
safety hazards and their frequency. An industrial fork truck was used as 
the vehicle from which time lapse motion, or memo-motion, pictures were 
taken during several time periods of industrial operations. The unsafe 
practices photographed were categorized into three general areas and, 
thence, into subordinate detailed groups in order to standardize and 
define the specific unsafe practices. 
The totals of these hazards were translated into a frequency per one 
thousand man-hours based on the number of hours of research and the num-
ber of employees at the research site. These frequencies were then used 
to establish a mean and control limits for a charting technique used to-
graphically display safety relativity. Ea.ch research site has an indi-' 
vidual chart. The charts, then, indicate a hazard frequency per one 
thousand man-hours of labor for each research site. These are expected 
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hazard frequencies of 7.90, 9.03, and 35.71 for Sites No. 1 9 No. 2, and 
No. 3, respectively. 
This data can then be applied by safety personnel to modify the 
periodic safety program emphasis or frequency and in the extreme to 
modify the philosophy of safety personnel as to concentration of their 
efforts. The data can also be of importance in evaluating the effective-
ness of the safety program as it ie used periodically throughout a time 
period. 
Conclusions 
The research work establishes a method by which the periodic safety 
program and a safety philosophy can be evaluated and indicate necessary 
modifications. In the first chapter for this study, the hypothesis is 
stated that the non-repretitive, extended time, activity cycle is subject 
to feasible safety analysis whereby unsafe acts can be determined quali-
tatively according to established categories and serve as the basis for 
safety program implementation and evaluation. By means of basic statis-
tical techniques and a modification of established useful work sampling 
techniques, a method of combining the statistics reduced from the photo= 
graphic raw data with qualitative analysis was developed. This method is 
feasible and economical enough for any moderately sized industrial con-
cern to use in evaluating the degree of safety among its employees and 
the effectiveness of the local safety program frequency and emphasis. 
Because of the photographic evidence of unsafe practices in the real 
situation, the interpretation and subjectivity inherent in most safety 
evaluations can be eliminated or redueed to a minimum. When a question 
arises as to the practice photographed being safe or unsafe, the 
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photographs are the actual evidence which, after study~ are the proof in 
the decision. 
The establishment of a Hazard Pattern Chart will give personnel 
responsible for safety a means of quantifying the evidence and indicating 
to management the relative safety of the local work force. In this day 
of quantitative techniques, the author feels that this is one of the 
primary features indicating the value of the method presented. 
A great many more samples of unsafe practices at the sites used in 
this research and at other sites is necessary to verify the usefulness of 
this research method. However, this study was intended to establish the 
feasibility of the method and show a direction of philosophical concepts. 
It is felt that this goal has been achieved. 
The additional samples of unsafe practices at the research sites 
used may well modify both the u means and the control limits established 
by this study. However, the method of arriving at these concepts as pre-
sented in this study has been proved to be feasible. 
The accuracy of the accident to hazard rat.io will take many samples 
and several years of historical data on accident statistics. Accidents 
occur infrequently when compared to the frequency of unsafe practices 
and, thereforej much work is required to establish statistics and empiri-
cal conclusions as to the relationship of ideas. Based on the cost data 
as detailed in Chapter II, however~ the required work seems well worth 
the effort. 
With the safety improvement methods used in today's complex industry 
being so nebulous and subject to interpretation based on widely separated 
criteria, this research should help indicate a more quantitative means to 
the goal of accident prevention. 
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Recommendations for Further Study 
There are several areas of study which occurred to the author during 
the research work which appear to be tangent to but not directly related 
to this work. These areas when developed would hopefully add to the 
structure presented. Several of these areas are as follows: 
1. From a quantitative standpoint, a study on whether or not 
the Poisson distribution actually fits the situation could 
be helpful. 
2. An increased scope of industries must be investigated to 
3. 
get sufficient data for general application of the method 
in various types of industries from general contracting 
one-time-only work to production line repetitive work 
using all types of large and small equipment. 
The research method presented here could be used in a study 
of safety involving pedestrians at crosswalks such as at a 
University or any school level where large numbers of people 
crowd crosswalks at repeated time intervals. 
4. In the same type of study as in 3 above, this research 
could be applied to the study of motor vehicle traffic 
intersections or circles where accident frequencies are of 
interest to traffic authorities. 
The above areas of further study indicate the wide area of possible 
use for time lapse photography. This method of data collection has 
almost unlimited potentialities. 
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